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Key messages 
“The definition of insanity is doing the same thing over and over again expecting different 
results.” Benjamin Franklin (and Albert Einstein) 
? There is no Israeli economic policy towards the Palestinian people or the occupied 
territory; rather there is a policy to maintain occupation and administration of the 
Palestinian territory by whatever means available, including economic strategies; 
? Israeli strategies deployed since 1967 have included economic inducements to 
improve the quality of life, devolution, and other schemes focused on promoting 
individual welfare but not preventing communal poverty; 
? The Oslo Accords and the Paris Protocol on Economic Relations (PER) of 1994 
formalized the de facto customs union in operation under occupation and locked in the 
adverse path of dependence of the Palestinian economy upon Israel; 
? Palestinian Authority institutions have been unable to establish sovereign or even 
autonomous institutions capable of expanding the space for economic policymaking 
and for economic polices promoting long-term development; 
? The effects of Israel’s dual strategy of skewed economic integration coupled with 
physical separation has led, over forty years, to divergence in per capita incomes 
between Israel and the territory, rather than the convergence promised by economic 
theory and the premises of the customs union; 
? Instead of continuing to repeatedly reform the facades of interim self-government, all 
efforts should aim to form the sovereign institutions for statehood; 
? New Israeli overtures under the heading of “economic peace” risk not only diverting 
attention from political processes, but also hark back to an era of Israeli domination of 
the Palestinian economy, which demonstrably failed; 
? Though the PER may have outlived its design and usefulness, it can only be 
superseded if a fundamentally different framework is envisaged, rooted in ensuring 
Palestinian sovereignty, statehood and economic viability; 
? A Palestinian economic strategy for sovereignty and peace would entail seeking 
recognition of the Palestinian economy as a separate customs territory, and would 
become the reference point for formulation of economic policy, institution-building, 
decision-making, and international economic relations;  
? Such a status would offer a platform for building a viable, vibrant and secure national 
economy for the envisioned State of Palestine, governed by a framework which 
adheres, among other principles, to the multilateral rules and disciplines embodied in 
the World Trade Organization; 
? Only through a Palestinian economic policy framework that is predicated on the 
separate, internationally recognized status of the economy of the occupied territory, 
which in turn helps to create the conditions to end occupation, can a viable Palestinian 
economy and a sovereign State emerge to deliver the promise of peace. 
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I. Occupation, sovereignty and development 
UNCTAD’s Accra Accord of 2008 advocated sustained assistance to the Palestinian 
people, not only to reduce the negative impact of economic and social adversity in the Palestinian 
territory, but “with a view to creating the conditions conducive to building a sovereign and viable 
Palestinian State” (para. 44).1 This commitment, reflecting an unprecedented global consensus on 
the need for a two-state solution, recognizes that the realization of such conditions has been 
undermined over past decades by the dynamics of conflict and the lasting legacy of a prolonged 
occupation. Indeed, the very economic, territorial and institutional policies needed to continue 
occupation are those which perpetuate conditions not at all conducive to Palestinian sovereignty 
and statehood.  
The policy measures of successive Israeli governments towards the Palestinian economy 
have been the overriding determinants of Palestinian economic performance and developmental 
prospects. Since 1967, these have evolved from aiming to integrate Palestinian economic 
resources (especially land, water and labour) into Israel’s “mainland” economy, to acting to 
marginalize and isolate the economy and markets of the Occupied Palestinian Territory. Whether 
by unilateral action or through economic and political agreements with Palestinian partners, this 
has contributed to a diminishing Palestinian economic and productive base. This has been 
accompanied more recently by stripping the putative Palestinian government and institutions of 
any means to expand or even sustain its policy space and attain control over its sovereign affairs. 
It is in this context that the early 2009 announcement of “economic peace” initiatives by the most 
recent Israeli government should be analyzed.  
In 2009, as the envisioned viable and vibrant Palestinian state is again on the international 
agenda, concerned economic policymakers can benefit from a candid assessment of how 
prolonged occupation – and the economic strategies associated with it – have been an obstacle to 
such a solution. In whatever form a new offer of Israeli economic liberalization towards the 
Palestinian economy might come, as long as it is not underpinned by the establishment of 
sovereign Palestinian economic institutions and adequate national economic policy space, its 
impact will ultimately prolong and deepen occupation. 
Drawing on the findings of UNCTAD’s annual reports since 1985 on the Palestinian 
economy under occupation, this review examines whether the “new” Israeli “economic peace” 
initiatives differ in essence from previous Israeli strategies towards the economy of the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory. A coherent argument emerges, which, firstly, highlights a strong continuity 
in Israeli policy affecting the economy of the Occupied Palestinian Territory (despite the 
changing strategies deployed). Secondly, this analysis calls for a bold departure from 
conventional “Palestinian economic policy wisdom”, which has left unchallenged the context, 
frameworks and policies of occupation, and which has advanced economic policy prescriptions 
oblivious to the impact of prolonged conflict. An alternative policy framework is needed, which 
recognizes the realities of the Palestinian economy and of what has been learnt of the 
uncomfortable truths about the incompatibility between occupation and development. 
A careful review of the dynamics over time of Israeli–Palestinian economic relations, the 
corresponding policy framework, and the institutional arrangements designed to manage those 
relations, reveals that policy and regulatory reform to date has not tackled the core weakness 
arising from prolonged and continuing occupation. While the Palestinian Authority has acquired 
the attributes of an interim self-governing authority, the key to successful economic management 
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consistent with independence and statehood – sovereignty – remains off the agenda. Meanwhile, 
the economic policymaking space that is needed to ensure viability – Palestinian national 
economic security – has yet to be marshalled.  
  3
II.  Israeli policies towards the Palestinian economy in the 
 1980s2 
For four decades, Israel’s relations with the occupied territory have been managed by the 
Israel Defense Forces. In 1967, its “Civil Administration” (currently, the Coordinator of 
Government Affairs in the Territories (COGAT)) assumed authority for Palestinian economic, 
political and institutional affairs, some of which have since devolved into the Palestinian 
Authority. Many of the policies and regulations issued by the Civil Administration until the early 
1980s directly concerned Palestinian economic affairs such as taxation, customs, banking, money 
and insurance, agriculture, industry and crafts, land and water, labour and other resources. The 
regulations devised in these areas were intended to ensure harmony with Israeli regional and 
international policy concerns, as summed up by the official stance that in the territories “there 
will be no development initiated by the Israeli Government, and no permits will be given for 
expanding agriculture or industry, which may compete with the State of Israel.”3 
A. The careful integrationism of the early 1980s 
Israeli policy towards the economy of the Occupied Palestinian Territory until this period 
featured a careful integrationist strategy which deprived Palestinians of central requirements for 
independent economic development, particularly in the form of the free operation of endogenous 
development capacities and authorities. Israeli policies in this period were based on the three 
premises of maintaining minimum order in the economic affairs of the occupied territory, not 
committing to advancing its economic interests, and ensuring that the regulation of economic 
activity corresponded to the general pattern of relevant policy and legislation in Israel. 
The result of this deliberate “integrationism” was increased vulnerability of the 
Palestinian economy to Israeli economic and political trends. For example, the 1986 recession in 
the Israeli economy, combined with the Government’s austerity programme which aimed to 
increase wage and price controls inside Israel, had direct and dire consequences for the 
Palestinian labour market, social expenditure, and living conditions. This was particularly the 
case given the lack of domestic Palestinian institutions that could regulate the effect of these 
external factors. 
Despite the “open bridges” policy pursued from the beginning of the occupation 
(allowing Palestinian exports to Arab and regional countries over the Jordan River bridges), the 
large number of obstacles related to customs, transportation and infrastructure prevented it from 
stimulating Palestinian trade with non-Israeli partners. Israeli–Palestinian trade relations were 
dominated by much higher levels of Israeli exports to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, while 
Palestinian agriculture and manufacturing remained focused on low value-added, uncompetitive, 
labour-intensive production processes. During this time, terms of trade were not defined by the 
market, but by the exigencies of Israeli economic activity and the extent to which Palestinian 
production conformed to that.  
The phenomenon of Israeli firms subcontracting work to the Palestinian labour-surplus 
economy for re-export to Israel and beyond, which emerged in the 1980s, has since become one 
of the main features of Israeli–Palestinian trade and economic relations. Such economic relations 
had minimal spillover effects on the local Palestinian economy and productive capacity, as
                                                 
2   The discussions and information in this section draw on the UNCTAD reports published since 1986. See the 
 references section. 
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subcontracting shifted from one branch to another in line with the changing trade dynamism of a 
liberalizing Israeli economy, while technology transfer was minimal.  
A major missing element in this pre-Oslo period was the existence of any Palestinian 
authority to assess the socio-economic needs of the territory or to institute the relevant policies. 
During these years of direct military governance, the population under occupation was not given 
the space or freedom to entertain a reasonable level of control over its own economic affairs. This 
was the case despite the fact that Jordan unilaterally severed all legal and administrative ties with 
the West Bank in 1988, creating a vacuum that needed to be filled. As a result, in a manner that 
aimed to pre-empt Palestinian demands for institutional and political independence, the Israeli 
strategy throughout the 1980s – actively supported and funded by the United States – was 
conducted under the theme of “improving the quality of life”, which aimed at “permitting 
personal prosperity but forcibly restraining communal development.”4 
B. The mirage of power-sharing: “condominium” and “devolution” in the  
mid-1980s 
This overall strategy was proposed through various power-sharing arrangements under 
elaborate schemes announced and partially implemented by the Israeli authorities, such as 
“condominium” and “devolution”. The former referred to a sort of “shared autonomy” in parts of 
the occupied territory, with the engagement of regional actors, so that responsibility for internal 
affairs, health, sanitation and social services could be passed on to local authorities while 
essential resources/areas remained under Israeli control. “Devolution” implied giving local 
inhabitants some degree of self-governance through measures such as a new banking system and 
land classification. In all such schemes, the crucial aspect of economic development and 
territorial planning remained the prerogative of the occupying power, with no local influences 
and interests brought to bear upon that process. In this period, the Civil Administration also 
sponsored initiatives such as the “Village Leagues” – groups of local Palestinian community 
figures working together with the authorities to maintain order, deliver services and manage other 
local authority affairs. The distorted vision of development under occupation that guided Israeli 
policy towards the Palestinian economy ensured a cost-free, selective integration of the 
Palestinian infrastructure and economy to that of Israel.  
This integrationist policy was aimed at projecting a notion of Palestinian autonomy, while 
effectively undermining even the simplest forms of self-government by measures on the ground 
such as the closure of all Palestinian banks (until 1994). Such a position deprived the economy of 
a dependable indigenous mechanism for financial intermediation, turning it into Israel’s largest 
export market until recently, while obliging Palestinian workers to seek employment in Israel. 
Such institutional constraints not only increased the Palestinian economy’s structural 
vulnerability to trends in the Israeli economy, but also handicapped its capacity for managing 
independent economic development and policymaking.  
Various sectors of the Palestinian economy suffered as a result of Israeli settlement 
policies, which began to accelerate in this phase. In 1987, there were 150 non-military Israeli 
settlements in the West Bank and Gaza with a total population of 52,000 (excluding East 
Jerusalem).5 The increase in settlements over the years had already reduced the cultivated area in 
the Palestinian territory from 36 per cent of total land area in the West Bank in 1966 to 27 per 
cent in 1984, and from 55 percent in 1966 to 28 per cent in 1985 in the Gaza Strip. Palestinian 
industry suffered as a result of the competitiveness from the highly subsidized Israeli industries, 
many of which were now also in very close proximity to the Israeli settlements in the territory. 
During this time, Israeli strategies focused on attracting Israeli industry and labour to settlements 
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in the occupied territory, as the new frontier or “hinterland”, through the provision of public 
investment and concessional tax and credit facilities to Israeli enterprises operating there, while, 
at the same time, dispersing Palestinian industry outside urban centres. In 1987, the Civil 
Administration also increased the maximum income tax in the territory, and imposed new taxes to 
increase government revenue and to align the tax system to that of Israel. The tax system was 
subject to numerous military orders and proclamations over time: in 1987 alone it was subject to 
177. 
An enduring feature of the relationship of the occupied territory to the governing power 
has been the leakage of its resources to the Israeli economy, whereby most of the value added of 
the Palestinian economy would return to Israel in various forms, such as income, production, and 
value added tax and other transfers (duties, fees, fines). These trebled between 1978 and 1984, 
with the proportion of Palestinian gross national product (GNP) transferred to Israel through 
taxation alone rising from 6 per cent in 1978 to 12 per cent in 1984. For example, the amount of 
tax transferred to Israel in 1984 was equivalent to 46 per cent of gross factor income from 
employment in Israel, 16 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP), and more than double of all 
private transfers (remittances and aid) received from abroad.  
The lack of an indigenous banking system had a dampening effect on many sectors of the 
Palestinian economy until 1994 – especially agriculture and the small private sector – and acted 
as a disincentive for entrepreneurs, while at the same time limiting productive investment 
opportunities. This encouraged capital flight or increasing reliance on external financial support. 
In the labour market, few new productive employment opportunities were being created in this 
period, resulting in a flight of labour from the declining and financially-deprived Palestinian 
traditional sectors, deprived of funding, to the labour-intensive Israeli economy. Hence, this 
period witnessed the neglect of the Palestinian productive sector, while aligning Palestinian 
aggregate demand to Israeli consumption and production needs. 
C. The first intifada, 1988: emergence of indigenous Palestinian 
economic initiatives and Israel’s selective integration strategies 
During the first intifada, Palestinians in the occupied territory pioneered a number of 
initiatives and measures aimed at reducing economic dependence on the Israeli economy. These 
measures included encouraging the boycotting of Israeli goods and jobs in Israel, promoting 
consumption of “national products”, encouraging a return to land and agriculture, and the 
generation of employment opportunities in local communities to compensate for job losses in 
Israel. This was the first time that an indigenous agenda was being elaborated for the Palestinian 
economy as part of a movement of national self-determination. 
In response, Israel first tightened its dual policy of security measures combined with 
administrative and economic measures to “bring the level of violence in areas down to a 
minimum in a matter of weeks.”6 However, this “semi economic war of attrition” was intended 
not only to contain the street clashes, but also to exert economic pressure on the inhabitants in 
order to reduce their ability to “resist”.7  
During this time, the Palestinian labour market continued to suffer from a high level of 
inflation in the Israeli economy, which was channelled through rising wages in the Israeli 
                                                 
6  UNCTAD, 1988. 
7   These Israeli measures included: preventing food convoys from entering areas under curfew; bans on fuel oil 
 and petrol deliveries; interruptions to electricity and water supplies to some Palestinian towns and villages; 
 restrictions on the movement of people and goods between the West Bank and Gaza Strip and on exports 
 from areas of unrest; arrest of Palestinian merchants for violation of military orders to remain open at hours 
 specified by the military; and withholding identity cards, important export licences and travel permits until 
 proof had been provided of taxes and payment of bills and fines (UNCTAD, 1988). 
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economy, further distorting the domestic labour market structure. The agriculture sector, although 
relatively isolated, faced restrictions on water access, confiscation of land, strict cropping 
patterns, restrictions on planting new fruit trees, the unfettered entry of cheap, subsidized Israeli 
agricultural imports to the territory, and strict control and regulation of agricultural marketing and 
exports. Out of a total annual water supply originating in the territory of 800 million cubic 
metres, the Palestinian inhabitants were allowed the use of only 110 million cubic metres, despite 
rapid population growth. High costs of fresh water forced many farmers to use brackish water 
mixed with fresh water from springs, which reduced the quality and competitiveness of their 
products even further.  
Furthermore, production and marketing in Israel of Palestinian agricultural products were 
subject to strict Israeli licensing and quota regulations. Meanwhile, Israeli subcontracting in the 
occupied territory intensified, geared increasingly towards finishing, assembling or processing 
Israeli raw or semi-processed material. For Palestinian indigenous industries, maintaining 
supplies of raw materials from or through Israel became an impossible task in the absence of any 
financial or trade intermediation options. For the first time since 1967, measures that entailed 
physical separation between Israel and the population/economy of the occupied territory became 
an issue of daily concern. 
By the 1990s, the Palestinian economy was showing sharp contractions compared to the 
preceding years, demonstrating its increased vulnerability after two decades of occupation and its 
inability to withstand internal and external economic and political volatility. However, this did 
not deter Palestinian initiatives aimed at self-sustainability, and it was in response to these 
measures that domestic economic initiatives were forthcoming, aimed at safeguarding the 
economy and fledgling non-governmental institutions, and ensuring a minimum basis for 
Palestinian economic activity. 
These initiatives included, in the case of the agricultural sector, a “return to land” policy 
to encourage revitalization of the sector and to maintain a certain level of subsistence. Palestinian 
initiatives and Israeli measures resulted in labour “absenteeism” in Israel at levels not previously 
known among the Palestinian migrant labourers, who were increasingly obliged to seek gainful 
employment in Israel. These and other steps towards “disengagement” of the Palestinian 
productive sectors, whose labour-absorptive capacity had already been stretched by the losses 
sustained during the uprising, led to growing Palestinian unemployment. The flow of all financial 
transfers from outside – especially Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Arab aid – was 
restricted, while rigorous and arbitrary collection of heavy taxes, duties and fines, and cutbacks in 
expenditure on social services created great pressures on all sectors of Palestinian society.  
In this period, maintaining the occupation required, above all, quelling the Palestinian 
uprising and preventing the “disengagement” of the Palestinian economy from its chronic 
dependence on Israel. Israeli policies had by now evolved into a “selective integration”, entailing:  
? An unbalanced tying of the economy of the territory to that of Israel;  
? Free Israeli access to Palestinian natural and human resources;  
? No Israeli allocation of resources to the productive sectors of the territory; and,  
? No efforts at creating conditions for the establishment of an infrastructure for 
employment and expansion of the local economy.  
Israeli authorities stated at the time that “we have to strike a balance between actions that 
could bring on terrible economic distress and a situation in which (the Palestinians) have nothing 
to lose, and measures which bind them to the Israeli administration and prevent civil 
II. Israeli policies towards the Palestinian economy in the 1980s 
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disobedience.”8 In other words, these measures were aimed at compelling the Palestinians to 
acquiesce to continued Israeli occupation. The restrictive measures deployed during these years 
included a range of economic sanctions.9 Palestinian responses came under two umbrellas, of 
“disengagement” from the Israeli economy and of “self-reliance” forms of economic activity to 
help the move away from the Israeli orbit.10 For example, the impact of labour absenteeism was 
at first significant: by mid-1988, 20–40 per cent of Palestinians who had previously worked in 
Israel had withdrawn from their jobs. Major transformations were noted in the size and 
composition of Palestinian labour working in Israel. Given the impact of absenteeism on the 
Israeli labour market, the Israeli Minster of Finance declared that “ending the uprising is one of 
the top priorities for the Israeli economy.”11  
Some of the Israeli measures which followed were therefore aimed at containing the 
damage to the Israeli economy resulting from disengaging from the Palestinian labour and 
markets. For example, the authorities began to selectively import Palestinian labour by imposing 
strict measures including passes, permits and restrictive transport arrangements. During this 
period, the industrial sector was also affected by the heightened Israeli measures and by 
Palestinian initiatives to strengthen the productive base of the domestic economy. Industrial 
activity faced practical difficulties in implementing subcontracting arrangements, while curfews 
and bans on transport hampered the harvesting of the strategically important olive crop. 
The international community in this period first called for increased assistance to the 
Palestinian people in United Nations General Assembly resolution 43/178 of 20 December 1988. 
As early as 1989, UNCTAD argued that in addition to immediate humanitarian relief, “the 
international community needed to encourage Israel to allow wide-ranging economic policy 
reform and liberalization in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including the right to economic 
policy formulation and management by the Palestinian people.”12 Since this initial statement of 
the need for reform even within the parameters of occupation, the issue of creating sufficient 
policy space for Palestinian development has continued to figure in UNCTAD writings and 
recommendations – a concept that is explored further in its current context in a forthcoming 
UNCTAD study.13  
                                                 
8   UNCTAD, 1989. 
9   These included bans on the entry of basic food supplies to Palestinians towns and villages; destruction of 
 crops, livestock, industrial and agricultural infrastructure; selective and arbitrary bans on irrigation and 
 harvesting; measures to prevent the sale of Israeli livestock to Palestinian farmers; restrictions on Palestinian 
 trade with Israel and Jordan; movement restrictions; preventing the activities of local service providers; 
 withholding Palestinian permits for movement and trade; cutbacks on expenditure in the areas of welfare and 
 health etc. 
10  These included: voluntary absenteeism of Palestinian workers from jobs in Israel and its settlements in the 
 Occupied Palestinian Territory; the boycotting of imported agricultural and manufactured goods from Israel, 
 especially where locally produced substitutes were available; minimizing the drain on Palestinian financial 
 resources constituted by Israeli financial policies in the territories, especially in the form of “tax resistance”, 
 and refusal to pay some of the Israeli-imposed taxes, especially given the inability to do so of many who had 
 lost their incomes after the intifada. 
11  UNCTAD, 1989. 
12  UNCTAD, 1989. 
13  UNCTAD (forthcoming). 
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III.  Israeli policies of the early 1990s: the Gulf War and 
 separationism14 
The period until the first intifada was characterized by benign neglect of Palestinian 
development needs while offering inducements for individual prosperity and preventing 
competition with Israeli economic interests. After 1988, numerous economic and other measures 
were used, with varying degrees of severity, to assert Israeli authority in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory. This escalation was combined with “remilitarization” of the administrative and 
decision-making apparatus of the Civil Administration in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, as 
Palestinian disobedience spread and as the Israeli “security first” logic acquired growing 
influence in policymaking.15 This entailed collective as well as specific economic sanctions 
against sectors of the population and individuals. 
Despite these, the Palestinian people managed to create the conditions for ceding a certain 
degree of policy space to allow the implementation of elements of recently elaborated strategies 
for economic survival and the eventual move towards independence. Indeed, the intifada had 
instilled new dynamics on the ground, and regional conditions in the wake of the 1990 Gulf War 
had brought to the forefront the need for a comprehensive peace in the region. This, in turn, 
paved the way for the launching of the Middle East Peace Conference in Madrid in 1991, and the 
negotiations that led to the Oslo Accords and the establishment of the Palestinian Authority. The 
stage, therefore, seemed to be set for some degree of separation of the Palestinian economy from 
that of the occupying power, even though the conditions may not have been ripened enough for a 
resolution of permanent status issues. 
Following the Gulf War, Palestinian incomes and employment suffered dramatically from 
the sudden stop in remittances from tens of thousands of Palestinians previously employed in the 
Gulf economies. The impact of the Gulf crisis was also felt inside the territories directly, through 
curfews imposed following the outbreak of regional hostilities. This period also coincided with 
the expansion of Israeli settlement activities and creation of new, apparently irreversible, facts on 
the ground. By 1990, the expropriation of Palestinian land had put at least 54 per cent of the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory under the control of the Israeli military and settlers. This did not 
slow down, and only heightened in early 1990s in a swathe of land expropriations. Officials gave 
the signal at the time that Israel has “always built, is building and will continue to build” 
settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.16 By mid-1991, there were at least 216,000 Israeli 
settlers in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (including East Jerusalem).17 Security concerns in 
Israel and the return of workers from the Gulf led to increased Israeli bans on movement of 
labour to Israel, leading to a debate in Israel about the “costs and benefits” of reliance on 
Palestinian labour, and efforts at replacing Palestinians with Israeli and, eventually, foreign 
workers. 
This period led to a re-evaluation of Israeli strategies towards the Palestinian economy 
and to consideration of certain reorientations in strategies, as stated by an Israeli official: “There 
is no change in policy but there is a new approach…. Instead of having the workers from the 
                                                 
14  The discussions and information in this section draw on UNCTAD reports published in 1991, 1992, and 
 1993. See the references section. 
15  See section VII. 
16   UNCTAD, 1991. 
17   UNCTAD, 1991. 
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territories come to factories in Israel, we want those factories to go to the territories.”18 Following 
this, the authorities announced tax relief measures for new industrial investment and for some 
existing enterprises in the Gaza Strip, as well as the establishment of an industrial zone in Gaza 
and consideration of possible alternatives for banking and credit facilities. This change in tone 
was motivated by several factors, including the sustenance and viability of most Palestinian 
initiatives despite restrictive Israeli policy measures; the increasingly active involvement of 
international donors in local Palestinian development projects; and perhaps most imperatively, 
considerations within Israel favouring less dependence on Palestinian labour (such as absorption 
of a million new immigrants from the former Soviet Union) and the consequent need to 
encourage job creation within the territory or face growing social discontent in Israel.  
Hence, the Israeli “separation strategy”, pursued until today, was born. It offered the only 
way to retain control of the occupied territory and its resources, entrench Israeli settlements and 
the settler population, and ensure minimal contact with the indigenous Palestinian population. 
Therefore, the period that followed the Gulf War was one of Israeli “dis-integrationist” policies; 
according to Israeli officials at the time: “The less of them [Palestinians] that will work in Israel, 
the better… now is the time to bring about substantial change through separation… we must see 
to it that Palestinians do not swarm us.”19  
With this in mind, after 1991 the occupation authorities adopted a new strategy of 
“liberalization” of some aspects of the economic policy environment, through tax exemptions for 
new industrial investments and relaxation of some of the long-standing restrictions on capital 
flows to the territories, and by easing the movement of export trucks across the border. In yet 
another permutation of an old theme, the lifting of these restrictions was officially referred to as 
improving “the welfare and standard of living of the Palestinian population… expanding 
employment opportunities and developing the local economy…”20 These policies, at some level, 
reflected a realization on the part of the Israeli authorities about the deteriorating state of the 
Palestinian economy in the wake of the Gulf War, and on the other hand, their desire to limit the 
entry of Palestinians to Israel and hence to encourage employment opportunities inside the 
occupied territory. During this period, Israel encouraged subcontracting activities, as a more 
beneficial way of increasing the competitiveness of Israeli industrial products, rather than the 
higher cost of employing Palestinians inside Israel.  
Containing the intifada and repositioning in line with the emerging regional peace process 
constituted the main driving force behind the Israeli policies and strategies of this period; it was 
within this vision that the idea of economic development “within” the occupied territory became 
the focus of Israeli attention. However, the strategies that were deployed to this effect were not 
part of a coherent and coordinated economic development policy for the territories. Many of these 
“liberalizing” measures were undermined by the ad hoc nature and interplay of other factors, such 
as the sluggish pace of “liberalization”, the lack of complementary infrastructure, and the 
“closure” of the occupied territory since 1993.  
For example, granting numerous business licences without putting in place the 
infrastructure and financing required for their operations makes such regulatory relaxations 
somewhat redundant. In addition, Palestinian factories which received permission for operation 
had to use Israeli inputs, thus ensuring some level of basic dependency on, and also benefit for, 
the Israeli economy. Closures in this period substantially reduced the levels of trade with Jordan, 
despite the initial Israeli policies intended to ease these transactions. The average daily number of 
crossings to Jordan by truck transporting industrial goods alone fell from 33 per day in 1987 to 18 
per day in 1990, and only 12 per day in 1991. As a result, ever since Israel first deployed this 
                                                 
18   UNCTAD, 1991. 
19   UNCTAD, 1993. 
20   UNCTAD, 1993. 
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strategy, physical separation did not allow for integration with alternative markets (West Bank–
Jordan; Gaza–Egypt); if anything, it meant more isolation for the Palestinian economy.  
The last phase of direct military administration of the occupied territory entailed, on the 
one hand, initiatives to create economic incentives, and on the other, the application of security 
measures which continued to limit the scope of Palestinian productive and income-generation 
activities. As early as 1992, UNCTAD argued that the way out for the Palestinian people was 
through viable legal and economic frameworks which can override Israeli occupation policies: 
“The Palestinian economy and its institutions need to be freed from arbitrary measures that distort 
economic structure and performance of the economy. As an initial step, the legal framework 
governing various aspects of the territory’s economy should be reviewed in the light of the 
immediate needs of the economy.”21 
In tandem with these “separationist” measures, Palestinian initiatives continued to leave 
their mark on developments during this period with varying degrees of success. One initial 
package of interrelated measures aimed at employing an increasing number of Palestinian 
workers in domestic sectors, and simultaneously at reorienting consumption patterns away from 
imports in favour of domestic products from diversified agricultural and industrial bases. The 
policies of “self-reliance” in this period faced obstacles, such as the inability of the domestic 
economy to direct adequate resources towards new productive investment; inadequate 
infrastructure to permit full utilization of idle manufacturing capacities; the absence of 
comprehensive and integrated employment-generation programmes; higher wages from work in 
Israel; increasing pressure on the domestic labour market from the return of Palestinian workers 
after the Gulf War; and, finally, but most importantly, the absence of sovereign Palestinian 
institutions capable of establishing priorities and guiding development decisions. 
                                                 
21   UNCTAD, 1992. 
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IV.  The Paris Protocol: a quasi customs union 
The Oslo Accords and the self-governing arrangements in the occupied territory that they 
conferred upon the PLO, to be managed by the Palestinian Authority, were heralded by their 
signatories as a break with the past. Much of that confidence was based on the agreement that the 
framework put in place by the Accords, including the Paris Protocol on Economic Relations 
(PER), would serve for an interim period of only five years, with permanent status issues – 
including those associated with sovereignty – to be negotiated and agreed within five years. 
The economic institutions that the Palestinian Authority was enabled to build within the 
scope of the PER did entail a withdrawal of the Israeli Civil Administration from those areas 
where the Palestinian Authority was granted jurisdiction – an unprecedented ceding to Palestinian 
hands of economic and local management functions that hitherto had been under direct Israeli 
control. While the Palestinian Authority strove to portray institutions as “national” in their role 
and purpose, the actual limits to their regulatory or enforcement authorities soon became apparent 
(in areas such as trade, fiscal management, banking, industrial zoning, agricultural resources, land 
use etc.).22 Furthermore, while the reality of direct Israeli rule was replaced by Palestinian “home 
rule” in the core “A” areas designated for Palestinian Authority jurisdiction under the Accords, 
the Israeli military remained in direct control of the surrounding “B” and “C” areas, while the 
Gaza Strip borders were and remain subject to Israeli control. Hence, while some policy-
management space was gained, the more pertinent question is how much the economy gained. 
Did the PER result in a less adverse impact of occupation on prospects for development (more 
policy space)? Did long-term benefit accrue from the prolonged proximity to – and under the 
PER, enhanced intimacy with – the Israeli economy? Indeed, the limited policymaking space 
might have been tolerable, and in retrospect, justifiable, had the latter criterion alone been 
satisfied.  
The PER formalized the de facto customs union between the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory and Israel that had come into existence during the period of direct Israeli military 
control. The choice of appropriate trade regime was a source of much tension in the PER. While 
Palestinian negotiators argued for a free trade agreement (FTA), which would require drawing 
customs borders between the territory and Israel, Israel called for a formalization of the customs 
union which had existed de facto since 1967 and for referral of all matters linked to borders to the 
permanent status negotiations. Many years later, in the context of negotiations launched in 2000 
at Camp David, Israel came to accept the idea of an FTA with a future State of Palestine, under 
the condition that it would retain the prerogative to put restrictions on Palestinian labour flows to 
Israel according to its domestic or security considerations. Such a condition, at a time when 
labour remittances from Israel constituted a large part of domestic revenues, made the customs 
union proposed by Israel apparently more attractive. At the time, PLO negotiators presented the 
concept as a small Palestinian customs envelope within a larger Israeli customs envelope. 
However the manner in which Israel has since freed itself of any reliance on Palestinian labour 
has rendered somewhat moot the debate about the comparative economic benefits of this or that 
trade regime as far as labour is concerned.  
                                                 
22  This, however, is not how they were viewed by Israel, which agreed in the Oslo Accords to the 
 establishment of the “Palestinian Authority”, while the PLO – with whom Israel signed the Oslo Accords – 
 simultaneously established the “Palestinian National Authority (PNA)”, in whose name all the Oslo-related 
 authorities of the Palestinian Authority devolved by the occupying power are administered and services 
 delivered. 
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This final outcome, a quasi customs union, as it contains elements of an FTA and a 
customs union,23 explicitly allowed Israel to “from time to time introduce changes in trade policy 
while notifying the Palestinian Authority”, hence institutionalizing the unequal trading relations 
between the parties.24 In addition, as stated by one European Commission official:  
The Protocol … created a joint customs union. The Palestinians had to agree [to it] 
essentially for political reasons. It was a deal, essentially to avoid having to tackle 
the question of territory, postponing the issue of borders until final status. The 
Israelis told the Palestinians: “You shut up during the intermediary period and we 
let your workers work in Israel.” But it did not work, because trade and 
employment were undermined by the closure policy and by the prohibition of 
Palestinians to work in Israel.25  
Therefore, far from granting the Palestinian Authority the freedom to import/export 
without Israeli supervision, the PER explicitly restricted the quantities of goods that could be 
imported/exported, giving Israel an effective veto power over Palestinian Authority requests 
regarding exports and imports. The intensifying Israeli closures during the 1990s were sufficient 
to offset much of the benefit that could have been gained from the proposed elimination of Israeli 
trade barriers on Palestinian agricultural products. How and on what basis Israel formulates its 
trade policies vis-à-vis the Palestinian Authority was not addressed by the Protocol. Article II of 
the Protocol also regulated Palestinian imports from countries other than Israel. It was expected 
that under the PER, Palestinians could achieve significant financial advantage from the new 
import regulations, through import taxes and levies on all goods explicitly designated for the 
Palestinian Authority, even if imported via Israel, as well as cheaper imports from alternative 
destinations. But this gain never materialized in the years following the signing of the Protocol.  
One of the major flaws of the PER was that under the Protocol, all Palestinian imports 
would still go through the Israeli customs system. Most Palestinian businesses have limited 
access to, or knowledge of, Israeli customs regulations and logistical services. This information 
asymmetry has, over time, reduced the competitiveness of Palestinian shippers. Article II of the 
PER regulates imports to the West Bank and Gaza from countries other than Israel, while imports 
to Israel remain unhindered. There are also lists of products that it “might” be possible to import 
from places other than Israel under certain conditions, such as not being final-assembly products, 
and having at least 30 per cent of the country of origin’s contribution to the product’s value. 
Quantitative limitations are attached to such imports, depending on “Palestinian market needs”, 
which are, in turn, determined by the Israeli authorities. Various related regulations regarding 
tariffs and customs further limited the Palestinian Authority’s scope for formulating trade policy. 
With regard to exports, the Protocol stated that there would be free movement of both 
agricultural produce and industrial goods between the two sides without additional customs and 
                                                 
23  The Protocol’s attempt to establish a Palestinian–Israeli trading relationship between a free trade agreement 
 and a customs union was done through a number of channels, for example: (i) the PER formalized the de 
 facto customs union in which the existing Israeli tariffs continued to serve as the common external tariff, 
 while quantitative restrictions were imposed on the export of five specific agricultural products from 
 Palestine. Israel also continued to maintain subsidies, indirect taxes and non-tariff barriers on a range of 
 imports; (ii) the PER allowed a partial opening of the West Bank and Gaza’s trade with Jordan and Egypt 
 and the rest of the world (through the latter two countries), but the quantities of this trade were to be agreed 
 upon between the Palestinians and Israel, based on an assessment of Palestinian needs; (iii) the Israeli VAT 
 system would be imposed on Palestine “to prevent illegal trade flows motivated by tax avoidance”; and 
 finally, (iv) the PER recognized that Palestinians would continue to work in Israel, but did not guarantee 
 unlimited access, and, in fact, gave the employing side the “right to determine from time to time the extent 
 and conditions of the labour movement into its area” (Zagha, 2004).  
24  Article VII of the PEP, 1994. 
25  Le More, 2008. 
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import taxes, subject to certain exceptions and arrangements, hence giving the impression that the 
Palestinian Authority would be able to export commodities to other countries as well, without the 
earlier barriers. Within the constraints of the Protocol, Palestinian exporters would be able to 
benefit from trade-promotion measures in the areas of credit, research, development assistance 
and direct tax benefits. However, the widening trade deficit since the signing of the Oslo Accords 
and the Paris Protocol draws a fundamentally different picture of the extent to which these 
promises materialized.26 
Under the PER, each side would administer its own trade tax policies, but the VAT rate in 
the Occupied Palestinian Territory could not be more than 2 percentage points lower than the 17 
per cent in Israel. Taxes on international trade would be shared between both, according to the 
“destination principle”.27 Receipts from taxes and fees paid by Palestinians inside Israel and 
Israeli settlements would be transferred to the Palestinian Authority. Israel would collect and 
transfer to the Palestinian Authority the indirect taxes and customs duty imposed on Palestinian 
imports from or via Israel, something which has since become a permanent instrument through 
which Israel exercises leverage over Palestinian economic and political affairs. Although the 
Palestinian Monetary Authority would be the sole and principal agent responsible for banking 
regulation in the territory, the issue of a Palestinian currency, which would carry with it the 
symbol of sovereignty, was postponed indefinitely under the PER, and the new Israeli shekel 
remained the main currency in circulation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.  
Although both sides were to maintain normal labour movement with each other, the PER 
failed to guarantee unlimited Palestinian access to the Israeli labour market since it granted Israel 
the right to determine the extent and conditions of this labour movement; in fact, if anything, the 
Protocol explicitly gave the employing side (Israel) the “right to determine from time to time the 
extent and conditions of the labour movement into its area”.28  
Therefore, as is already evident, the PER inherently linked the Palestinian economy to the 
foreign trade regime of Israel and the latter’s rights and obligations under WTO and TRIPS, 
binding Palestinian trade with third parties to these rules, without enjoying any of the benefits of 
these agreements. This quasi customs union exposed the fragile Palestinian economy to the winds 
of globalization without any type of protection or transition during liberalization of the Israeli 
economy in the 1990s. Therefore, by virtue of the PER, the Palestinian economy was now paying 
the price of WTO membership, since its markets were now open through Israel to products from 
all WTO members, without benefiting from WTO rules to regulate the trade practices of WTO 
members, including Israel.  
As a result, Israel remained the occupied territory’s main trading partner in the post-Oslo 
years, receiving more than 90 per cent of its exports. Under the PER, the Palestinian Authority 
has become critically dependent on Israeli rebates of customs and income taxes. However, the 
limits and costs of this dependence were soon realized. For example, Israel interpreted “imports” 
into the territory in a peculiarly restrictive way: they would only count as imports those goods 
directly imported by Palestinian companies via Israel, and not those imports into the territory that 
                                                 
26  As the former United States Consul-General in Jerusalem explained: “The European Union told Palestinians 
 that they could export cut flowers and strawberries… At Karni and Erez (entry points between Israel and 
 Gaza), the Israel Defence Forces trashed the boxes, in search for bombs. Then, Palestinians tried to export 
 them via the Sinai. Yet the boxes of flowers and strawberries would remain for days at the border until they 
 were spoilt. Eventually, the Palestinians were told they could export to Europe, provided they sold first to the 
 Israeli firm Agrexco (which handles most Israeli agricultural exports). Agrexco would of course determine 
 the price… This is an example of how the spirit of the agreement was undermined” (Le More, 2008). 
27  This means that collected tax revenues should be allocated to the Palestinian Authority, even if the 
 importation was carried out by Israeli importers, when the final destination explicitly stated in the import 
 documentation is a corporation registered by the Palestinian Authority and conducting business activity in 
 the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Paris Economic Protocol: Article III-15). 
28  Article VII of the PER, 1994. 
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were first imported via an Israeli company for onward shipment to Palestinian traders. 
Reclaiming customs duties would not apply to the latter type of imports, although they 
constituted the bulk of imports to Palestine.  
This, as well as many other terms of the PER, limited the Palestinian Authority’s access 
to a large part of revenues from imports. The PER lacked any monitoring of implementation 
mechanisms, which was particularly harmful as such mechanisms could have prevented the 
persistent leakage of revenues collected by Israel on behalf of the Palestinian Authority. The Joint 
Economic Committee, established by the Protocol to manage its implementation, was an 
unwieldy, politicized body whose technical machinery never served an effective dispute 
resolution function. Hence, it failed to provide any governance role or address issues such as the 
leakage of revenues imposed on imports from the rest of the world through indirect Israeli routes 
and intermediaries, resulting in substantial revenue losses for the Palestinian Authority.29 These 
leakages implied that the Palestinian Authority actually needed to divert imports away from 
Israel, something which was hard to do given the dependency situation of the post-1967 decades, 
reinforced by the Protocol.  
 
                                                 
29  According to the World Bank estimates, approximately one third of imports from Israel have been indirect 
 imports, which are imported to Israel and then re-exported to the Occupied Palestinian Territory. For these, 
 not only has the Palestinian Authority not received any tariff revenues, but their prices in the domestic 
 Palestinian market have often been augmented by Israeli VAT. This “re-export” has had a very negative 
 effect on fiscal leakage in Palestine. The World Bank estimated that, by February 2003, the revenue lost 
 under this arrangement amounted to 3 per cent of Palestinian GDP (de Melo et al., 2003).  
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V.  The “skewed integration” of the 1990s: development  
 under occupation? 
Palestinian policymakers and most conventional wisdom of the period argued that 
remaining in the customs union saved the Palestinian Authority the costs of establishing and 
managing alternative trade arrangements with Israel. These included setting up customs borders 
(training personnel, building customs posts, buying computers) and collecting taxes on third-party 
trade. In addition, it was argued that staying in a customs union also dealt with issues of political 
economy, since alternative trade policies could also face the same restrictions, generate 
corruption, and hence be as harmful. Such viewpoints do not take into account the fact that the 
establishment of independent, indigenous trading institutions, however costly, confers strategic 
benefits rather than total dependence on existing ones which neither allow for free Palestinian 
exports nor ensure the Palestinian Authority’s receipt of import revenues withheld by Israel. After 
all, “development is about a costly process of change during which, despite short-term costs to 
the economy, the institutional structures which are essential for its long-term growth are 
established.”30  
The restrictions on Palestinian exports to Israel – such as meeting various security, 
environmental, health and safety standards, and overcoming infrastructural barriers and lack of 
access to markets – were not only unaffected under the PER, but further restrictions and 
quantitative limitations aimed at protecting Israeli producers were added to Palestinian exports. 
Many of the critics of the PER have expressed disappointment at the acceptance by the 
Palestinian Authority of the terms of these quotas while Israel’s extensive subsidy programme for 
its agricultural producers includes credit on concessionary terms, subsidized factors of production 
(especially water and land), export finance, and minimum price levels for certain products. Given 
the nature of this agreement, the Israeli cost structure, high costs, and difficulty of access to cheap 
inputs, the Palestinian economy was unable to diversify its export range and its trading partners. 
In 2005, more than 90 per cent of Palestinian trade still took place with Israel, with the 
unbalanced trade ratio with Israel widening the Occupied Palestinian Territory’s already existing 
trade deficit.  
In practice, the context in which the PER was managed undermined production and 
exports from both agriculture and industry in the territories. Both horizontal (land area) and 
vertical (intensification) expansion of the agriculture sector have been restricted for decades in 
the Occupied Palestinian Territory. During the PER years, horizontal expansion was limited by 
land and water availability, which resulted from confiscation of these resources by the 
occupational forces, and which was also due to expansion of Israeli settlements. Vertical 
expansion was limited too, mainly due to lack of access to markets, which itself was a result of 
high costs of production and inefficient production caused by lack of access to pesticides and 
equipment, as well as agricultural subsidies in Israel and other neighbouring Arab countries. The 
scope for industrial growth also remained limited, and industrial competitiveness was further 
undermined by inflated transaction costs. All this implied that the asymmetric relationship 
unilaterally imposed by Israel since 1967 was reinforced and institutionalized under the PER.  
Any outcome of the negotiations depended on Israel’s “unique system of complex 
regulations and procedures mainly linked to Israeli security considerations”, which undermined 
the revival of the Palestinian agricultural sector and the potential for growth of an endogenous 
industrial base, making the Palestinian economy vulnerable to external shocks such as closures.31 
                                                 
30  Taghdisi-Rad, 2009. 
31  Salem, 2006. 
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These restrictions, which act as non-tariff barriers against Palestinian trade, left little space for 
trade policymaking or for other aspects of sovereign economic action.32  
Both theoretical analysis and empirical studies suggest that polarization effects are likely 
to be dominant in the early stages of integration. Under normal circumstances, the dynamics of 
integration display a pattern of divergence followed by convergence. In the early stages, the large 
economy, with a more developed manufacturing sector, enjoys increasing returns to scale, which 
tends to wipe out small industries and handicraft production in the small economy, and 
consequently the gap widens between the two economies. In later stages, a switch occurs in the 
dynamics, as the increasing costs in the large economy and the external diseconomies produced 
by congestion begin to outweigh the benefits of greater efficiency and higher return to capital and 
labour. Investment in the small economy becomes more attractive. As a result, the poor economy 
starts to grow faster than the rich economy, narrowing the gap. 
Had economic relations between the Israeli and Palestinian economies been confined to 
the dynamics of normal free-market forces, the gap between per capita incomes should have 
widened in the first years of the occupation, and then become smaller. What happened was, in 
fact, the opposite. The pattern was one of a slow convergence during the first two decades of 
occupation, followed by divergence. Palestinian GDP per capita grew from 11 per cent of that of 
Israel to 14 per cent until the end of the 1970s, but then, the ratio declined almost continuously, 
except for a brief turnaround during the 1990s. At 9 per cent in 2000, it was still below its level 
prior to Oslo, and since then it has plunged further – to half its level of 30 years ago.  
Pattern of convergence/divergence between Israeli and  
Palestinian real GDP per capita (1995 $) 
Source: Based on UNCTAD, 2006. 
The reason for this abnormal pattern is that the economic relationship between the two 
economies was not confined to the working of the polarization and spread effects throughout 
markets. The economic strategies implemented since the start of the occupation, which increased 
in intensity over time, reinforced the effects of polarization and diminished the spread effects. 
Most of the convergence experienced in the 1970s–1980s was driven by income growth 
generated from exporting Palestinian labour to Israel. However, over the long term, along with 
                                                 
32  Arnon, 2002: 11. 
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restrictions imposed on the flow of Palestinian exports of goods and services to non-Israeli 
markets, this has distorted the labour market, with the ultimate outcome of a reduction in 
domestic labour productivity. 
Another feature of this integration-without-convergence syndrome has been the relative 
freedom of the Israeli economy to facilitate trade and factor mobility (labour or capital – e.g. the 
subcontracting and border industrial zone phenomena) between Israel and the territory according 
to various prerogatives. This has gradually eliminated trade based on comparative advantage, and 
has confined it to trade based on absolute advantage. As a result, the small economy exports low-
skill goods and imports high-skill goods, thus “locking in” its poverty, and increasingly being 
relegated to the status of a backward region in an advanced country. This dynamic has reinforced 
adverse path dependence – distorting the development of the Palestinian economy – and has 
inhibited its growth. The negative impact of this dependence did not cease to be felt once the new 
policy framework of the PER was in place. Quite the contrary, the economy has remained along 
this path since then, and no mechanisms have been designed to mitigate or disengage from this 
integration-without-convergence. 
Ultimately, the core flaw in PER, and as some argue, in the Oslo agreements as a whole, 
was the failure to address the issue of Palestinian sovereignty adequately, or even to envision it as 
an eventuality, leading to further dependency and irreversible loss for all aspects of the 
Palestinian economy. Amidst the euphoria surrounding the signing of the Oslo Accords, the late, 
eminent scholar Edward Said commented:  
By accepting that questions of land and sovereignty are being postponed till “final status 
negotiations”, the Palestinians have in effect discounted their unilateral and 
internationally acknowledged claim to the West Bank and Gaza: these have now become 
“disputed territories”… Moreover, rather than becoming stronger during the interim 
period, the Palestinians may grow weaker, come more under the Israeli thumb, and 
therefore be less able to dispute the Israeli claim when the last set of negotiations begins. 
But on the matter of how, by what specific mechanism, to get from an interim status to a 
later one, the document is purposefully silent. Does this mean, ominously, that the interim 
stage may be the final one? 33 
The interim period arrangements therefore encouraged a skewed integration of the 
Palestinian economy with Israel and its settlements in the territory. But the architects of the PER 
had envisaged the interim period as one of reconstruction and growth. Indeed, the Palestinian 
Authority adhered faithfully to the Protocol, just as it tolerated its perceived weaknesses, on the 
assumption that it would ensure a new, hospitable economic environment markedly different 
from that of the direct occupation period. Underpinning that misplaced hope were three factors, 
which were regarded by policymakers as sufficient to enable the Palestinian Authority to adopt an 
economic policy emphasizing growth and development: 
(a) The expectation that a new era of peace and cooperation would be characterized by an 
open border policy, allowing the export of Palestinian labour services to Israel as a 
cushion to bolster income in the interim period; 
(b) The belief that the removal of occupation-related restrictions would also entail an end to 
the confiscation of land and the expansion of settlements, and hence create an atmosphere 
free of conflict that would promote private enterprise and public investment; and 
(c) The commitment of the international community to extend financial resources to help 
finance the Palestinian reconstruction and development effort, envisioned as an 
instrument to consolidate domestic savings and provide foreign exchange. 
                                                 
33  The Morning After. London Review of Books. 21 October 1993. 
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Ultimately, however, political factors combined to create an environment towards the end 
of the interim period different from that proclaimed by the PER, fraught with growing violence, 
mistrust and uncertainty. These engendered adverse repercussions, bringing down income levels 
for the average Palestinian during the interim period. While these setbacks did not halt the 
inexorable progress of Israeli–Palestinian negotiations, they dampened public satisfaction with 
the interim economic and trade arrangements. The first casualty of adverse political developments 
was the concept of an open border. Throughout the interim period, Israel adopted a strategy of 
intermittent “closures” – both external (with Israel, Jordan and Egypt) and internal (within and 
between regions of the West Bank and Gaza Strip). The economic losses resulting from these 
closures were considerable in terms of interruption to the movement of labour and goods between 
the Palestinian territory, Israel and the rest of the world, which, in turn, led to falls in production 
and income. 
In addition, continuing Israeli settlement activity perpetuated conflict and mistrust. In 
June 2000, the parties finally resolved four pending interim-period economic and trade issues that 
had first been introduced for negotiation at Wye River in October 1998. Adverse political 
developments also counteracted the positive impact of financial resources injected into the 
economy by the donor countries, and reduced the expected flow of foreign investment. Resources 
earmarked for long-term investment were allocated instead to emergency efforts, such as job 
creation and financing the emerging budget deficit of the Palestinian Authority. The delay until 
2000 in negotiations on permanent status issues infused economic activity with further 
uncertainty, discouraging both domestic and foreign investment.  
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VI.  The second intifada and the dysfunctional Paris 
 Protocol since 2001 
The realities created since the second intifada led to an even more dramatic change in the 
landscape of the occupied territory and its economic structure. The Palestinian economy 
underwent a deep crisis from October 2000 to the end of 2002, as reflected foremost in the trade 
sector: exports declined sharply, due to severe border restrictions and the discriminatory 
treatment that Palestinian products received at Israeli ports. The years 2003–2005 saw a gradual 
stabilization and recovery: there was some growth in GDP and a decline in the share of trade 
(mainly exports) with Israel, with some being replaced by trade with European, Asian and Arab 
countries. By 2004, 40 per cent of Palestinian exports were manufactured goods, while the rest 
consisted of agricultural products, mineral fuels, lubricants, and related materials. 
Dependence on the export of labour services to Israel made the Palestinian economy 
particularly vulnerable to the frequent and irregular blockage of Palestinian labour flows to Israel 
in the aftermath of the second intifada. These “backwash” or “polarization” effects explained the 
disappearance of many industries in the small economy of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
with its “confinement to production of low-skilled goods, and emigration of a sizable segment of 
its labour force to the neighbouring economy”.34 As noted above, the “economic 
integration/separation” cycle with Israel has led to massive divergence of the two economies and 
their per capita incomes. 
Chronic Palestinian economic dependency upon Israel was perpetuated by the unchanging 
framework of the PER and the dysfunction of most of its machinery, especially during a time of 
great upheaval in the economy. The dependence on Israeli currency, foreign exchange, trade 
agreements, national priorities, and security concerns – which was reinforced in these agreements 
– meant that the status and stability of the Palestinian economy was further linked, even 
institutionally, to that of Israel. Towards the end of the five-year interim period, numerous 
Israeli–Palestinian study groups had advanced models for future economic relations between two 
sovereign states, but these were soon dashed against the rising tide of violence and the Israeli 
security-first logic which came to dominate economic relations, much as it had in the pre-Oslo 
period.  
Following the second intifada, Israeli policies of land and water confiscation expanded, 
now based on “security concerns”. For example, by July 2004, 86 per cent of the land confiscated 
for the construction of the Separation Barrier in the West Bank was agricultural land, leading to 
the loss of some of the region’s most fertile agricultural lands. The land confiscated for the 
construction of the Barrier is among the richest and most productive agricultural land in the 
northern West Bank, and as a result of its construction, access to some of the best water sources 
in the West Bank have been and continue to be lost, while creating simultaneous access and land-
ownership problems for Palestinian farmers. When completed, nearly 10 per cent of the overall 
land in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, will lie in the area between the 1967 border and 
the Barrier in places where its alignment runs inside the West Bank. Meanwhile, Israel’s West 
Bank settler population has grown – from 116,300 in 1993 to 289,600 by 2009.35 The numbers in 
East Jerusalem have increased from 152,800 to more than 186,000. After 40 years, almost half a 
million Israelis had settled in the occupied West Bank, equivalent to almost 15 per cent of the 
Palestinian population in the territory.  
                                                 
34  UNCTAD, 2006. 
35  Kurtzer, D. The settlement facts. In: Washington Post. 14 June 2009. 
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Political and security developments after 2000 brought a halt to the regular transfer of 
clearance revenues from Israel to the Palestinian Authority – a system which was established 
under the PER. Israel first refused to transfer any revenues to the Palestinian Authority between 
September 2000 and December 2002. The transfer of revenues then resumed, coming to another 
halt in 2006–2007. Irregular flows of donor support in this period – as well as Israel’s intermittent 
decisions regarding transfer of Palestinian Authority revenues – prevented the Palestinian 
Authority from fulfilling its normal obligations as a governing authority. Revenue clearance 
remains conditional upon parallel Palestinian Authority compliance with its security 
commitments under the Oslo Accords (and more recently, the Road Map). Since then, better 
Israeli–Palestinian Authority relations have ensured a regular functioning of the mechanism, but 
it remains one that is powered, above all, by political and security considerations. 
To these should be added the general decline in the Palestinian Authority’s domestic tax 
revenues, due to high levels of unemployment and low levels of purchasing power. All this 
implies that the Palestinian Authority, as a self-governing entity, has been unable to contribute to 
the revival of the Palestinian trade sector through provision of subsidies or other incentive 
mechanisms and safety nets for import-competing sectors and infant industries. In turn, the 
revenues of the Palestinian Authority have also suffered as a result of the sharp decline in export 
revenues and trading activity. In these circumstances, across-the-board liberalization, as 
advocated by some observers, risks aggravating the budgetary constraints by reducing trade tax 
revenues even further.  
Much of this dilemma can be framed by the “security first” logic underlying the Oslo 
Agreements and the subsequent Road Map. Within this framework, collection by Israel of 
Palestinian customs duties and VAT on imports effectively gives it control over significant parts 
of Palestinian public revenues. These and other economic aspects of the Oslo Agreements were 
justified on the ground of short-term expediency and the need to ensure compliance by the 
Palestinian side before greater sovereignty could be transferred. However, the prolonged interim 
period – originally intended to end by 1999 – has shown that the institutionalization of these 
measures has inflicted a heavy toll on the Palestinian economy in the context of what has been 
termed a policy of “asymmetric containment”.36 By design, these measures are serious enough in 
their potential ability to harm Palestinian interests through the threat of asymmetric pressure, 
when Israel deems that a given situation constitutes a case of security non-compliance by the 
Palestinians. 
While the post-Oslo institutional set-up features some integration aspects, these have been 
largely shaped by this asymmetric containment policy. The preceding examination of 
Palestinian–Israeli economic relations since 1967, and even since 1994, shows that any 
integration has been mainly confined to the use of unskilled Palestinian labour in low value-
added and non-strategic activities in the construction, manufacturing and agricultural sectors, in 
addition to extraction of natural resources (such as water, and also stone and marble used to 
construct Israeli settlements). Moreover, although there has been some Israeli subcontracting 
investment in Palestinian industries, such as the garments industry, they are limited in scope and 
technological content.
  
The most prominent Israeli–Palestinian “joint ventures” since the 1990s have entailed 
monopolistic collaboration between suppliers of certain key commodities (e.g. petrol and 
cement). Within this strategic framework, therefore, the growth implications for the Palestinian 
economy are strikingly different from those inherent in a strategy of balanced integration. This is 
because the economic arrangements, particularly movement restrictions, have contributed to 
maintaining the vulnerability of the Palestinian economy to Israeli prerogatives. Therefore, during 
this period, the Palestinian economy has continued to feature shrinking policy autonomy and an 
absence of economic strategies that could eventually challenge asymmetric containment. The role 
                                                 
36  Khan, 2004 
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of the international community in this respect has not been especially bold, generally favouring 
neoliberal economic policy formulas and generous funding of a political-economic relation 
between the Palestinian Authority and Israel that does not challenge prolonged occupation, 
address its deep impact, or enable Palestinian economic self-determination.37  
                                                 
37  Taghdisi-Rad, 2009. 
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By 2009, 15 years after the PER came into existence as an interim economic agreement 
valid for a five-year period that was never formally renewed, it remains the de facto economic 
law of the land. Whatever life it ever had in it – as a framework for revenue clearance, dispute 
resolution, banking regulation, import diversification or even economic convergence – has been 
dissipated by the effect of the past eight years of conflict, unilateralism on the part of Israel, 
Palestinian institutional attrition, and the failure of the political negotiation process between the 
parties to yield results. More recently, the economic-policy, if not the legal, implication of the 
Israeli disengagement of Gaza in 2005, and the state of isolation that the Strip has endured since, 
has been to effectively separate Gaza from the inner Palestinian customs envelope within the 
overall Israeli customs envelope. Today, Gaza remains suspended somewhere between the PER 
and the pre-Oslo arrangement of direct rule by the occupying power, with the PER effectively 
obsolete as far as its operations at Gaza’s borders is concerned. 
As is manifest from the above review of the evolution of Israeli strategies towards the 
Palestinian economy, Palestinian policy space has continued to shrink over time – something 
which is in contradiction to one of the expressed purposes of the PER of laying the grounds for 
“strengthening the economic base of the Palestinian side and for exercising its right of economic 
decision-making in accordance with its own development plan and priorities.”38 Therefore, 
although by the end of the 1990s it was clear that Palestinian Authority’s economic policies 
should focus on the growth of industrial and agricultural production, and be geared towards 
employment creation, the expansion of exports and the lowering of imports, the Palestinian 
Authority did not have the institutional or regulatory authority to carry forward such policies, and 
it was unable to take any new policy initiative in the face of the almost non-stop humanitarian 
crisis since 2000.39 
Leaving the design, legality, implementation and other flaws of the PER aside, that 
policymakers can today seriously consider a continuation of the economic policy status quo as 
either optimal or even tolerable is difficult to comprehend. This is an historical moment when 
viable statehood and sovereignty should be the order of business, and the appropriate recognition 
of the need for a doctrine of Palestinian national economic security should be forthcoming. 
Instead, the Palestinian economy is held hostage to the PER, and its development prospects seem 
no better than they were during the phase of direct military occupation under the Israeli Civil 
Administration, however much Palestinians under occupation today enjoy the trappings of self-
                                                 
38  Preamble to the PER cited in UNCTAD, 1998. 
39  The adverse effects of the PER are referred to specifically in one Palestinian Authority document (which has 
 since been superseded by others), namely the Medium-term Development Plan for 2005–2007: “The 
 Protocol on Economic Relations signed in Paris on 29 April 1994 resulted in the formalization of partial 
 integration into the Israeli economy through a one-sided customs union. On the one hand, the customs union 
 did not allow for full enough integration, having barred the benefits of a single market with Israel that would 
 have provided free movement of all goods, services and factors of production. On the other hand, it resulted 
 in domination of the Israeli economy: a more restrictive free trade agreement, as opposed to a customs 
 union, would have allowed control of borders and thereby independent tariffs on the import of goods from 
 other countries. This lack of sovereignty has sustained an element of dependency on the Israeli economy. 
 Palestinian companies have had a hard time competing with Israeli companies even in the Palestinian market 
 due to public subsidies to Israeli companies. Under this customs union, the Occupied Palestinian Territory 
 has been subject to the Israeli tariff structure, which reflected Israeli developmental needs but not those of 
 the Occupied Palestinian Territory.” Ministry of Planning (2004). Medium-term Development Plan 2005–
 2007. 
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rule and a measure of self-governance. While the latter is not an achievement that any responsible 
policymaker can easily jeopardize, the PER is neither sacrosanct nor etched in stone. The time is 
opportune for a new phase in Palestinian economic self-determination that supports the efforts to 
achieve national self-determination in the broader sense, in line with relevant United Nations 
resolutions.  
The preceding analysis has demonstrated that whatever strategy towards the economy of 
the occupied territory was pursued unilaterally by Israel or bilaterally with the PLO/Palestinian 
Authority, there remains one constant in the equation: expanding Israeli settlement and 
occupation-related controls, as against diminished Palestinian economic policy space, territory 
and economic structure and scale from the Palestinian perspective. Such persistent asymmetry 
cannot provide for an equitable economic relationship between two sovereign economies, nor 
would it pass the test of compliance with multilateral trade laws and the standards of international 
economic relations that must be factored into any future political settlement. This is not to 
mention that the adverse trend of Palestinian economic path dependence on Israeli economic 
fortunes and prerequisites was not a Palestinian choice, nor is it a relationship that has conferred 
any lasting benefits on the Palestinian economy or its increasingly impoverished population. 
Despite all this, in 2009, rather than acknowledging these realities and making a clean 
break with the occupation-first logic that has determined the path of Palestinian economic 
growth, no movement can be perceived on the economic-policy horizon. Indeed, the idea of 
reform of existing Palestinian Authority institutions to make them better serve the now much-
prolonged interim period has taken precedence within Israeli, Palestinian and donor policymaking 
circles over the need to form the national economic policy and institutional framework for 
statehood. It is implausible that somehow with enough tinkering with Palestinian Authority 
reform and other preconditions being satisfied, the nascent Palestinian state will be better 
equipped to hit the ground running, so to speak, than it would have been either in 2000 at the end 
of the interim period, or in 2002 when the international community first endorsed its 
establishment, or even today. While it is generally acknowledged that the past five years of 
reform have delivered some governance outcomes, in terms of financial management and security 
restructuring, the Palestinian Authority political and constitutional system – one of the 
institutional achievements of the interim period which still operated into the first decade of the 
new millennium – is today fractured and itself of limited functionality. 
It is within that perspective that the apparently new orientations in the policy towards the 
Palestinian Authority of the Israeli Government of 2009, with its emphasis on improving 
economic relations, should be understood and the appropriate policy response envisaged. Prior to 
his designation, the new Israeli Prime Minister had argued that the first step to a lasting peace 
needs to be the fostering of the Palestinians’ economic situation. “We must weave an economic 
peace alongside a political process. That means that we have to strengthen the moderate parts of 
the Palestinian economy by handing rapid growth in those areas, rapid economic growth that 
gives a stake for peace for the ordinary Palestinians.”40 The formation of an “administrative 
body” that will be responsible for Israel’s “economic peace” policies was one of the 
recommendations put forth by a panel of senior Israeli government advisers.41 As outlined, such a 
body would coordinate activities with the international community and the Palestinian Authority.  
                                                 
40  Ahren R. Netanyahu: Economics, not politics, is the key to peace. In: Haaretz. 21 November 2008. 
 Available at http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1038970.html. 
41  Ravid B and Harel A. Netanyahu’s opening gambit: a special body on “economic peace”. In: Haaretz. 26 
 March 2009. Available at http://www.haaretz.co.il/hasen/spages/1074095.html 
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This high-level committee is reportedly tasked with “developing the Palestinian economy” and 
“improving the quality of life”, through some 25 economic initiatives in the West Bank.42  
In line with this, the Israeli Prime Minister has issued his appeal for an “economic peace,” 
to boost the Palestinians’ moribund economy and to lay the groundwork for future peace talks: “I 
call upon the leaders of the Arab countries to join together with the Palestinians and with us to 
promote economic peace. Economic peace is not a substitute for peace, but it is a very important 
component in achieving it. Together we can advance projects that can overcome the problems 
facing our region.”43 Prior to that, a senior PLO negotiator had commented that “rather than 
ending the occupation” the Israeli Prime Minister “has proposed an ‘economic peace’ that would 
seek to normalize and better manage it. Instead of a viable Palestinian state, his vision extends no 
further than a series of disconnected cantons with limited self-rule.” Another PLO official has 
said that if the Israeli Prime Minister “insists on talking about the economic solution, then this 
will be a waste of time. Without moving on the political track ... it will not lead to peace or 
solutions. On the contrary, it will make things worse.”44 
Regardless of the fate of such a strategy to improve the Palestinian quality of life, the fact 
that it forms the centrepiece of Israeli Government relations with the Palestinian Authority 
testifies to a failure to heed the lessons of 40 years of occupation. Even the most deliberately and 
elaborately designed instrument used to administer occupation since 1967, the PER, could not 
disengage the Palestinian economy from the economic integration-cum-physical separation 
dynamics within which Israel has administered its economic relations with the occupied territory. 
Indeed, the expectation that a series of economic inducements to improve individual welfare 
might succeed today where they failed a generation ago is somewhat short-sighted. Such 
measures serve only as temporary panacea in the absence of autonomous economic power. And 
that the bold promise of Oslo and the interim period of development and the premise that 
ultimately sovereignty and independence would ensue, may be abandoned for yet another 
indeterminate interim period, is tragic. This is especially so in the Palestinian context of 
prolonged occupation and the deteriorated Palestinian economic, political and social capacities – 
at a time when the much-postponed imperative of statehood could be destined for yet another 
delay until regional political factors are more favourably aligned. 
The recent Israeli reorientation may be considered by most parties as a non-starter, at 
least to the extent that it would be a substitute for or would precede a political process. However, 
it is not adequate to simply dismiss this latest economic strategy towards the Palestinian 
Authority. Instead, it is incumbent on policymakers to carefully examine whether the lessons of 
40 years of occupation do not call instead for an initiative to define a Palestinian economic 
strategy for peace and sovereignty. This should be predicated not only on the imminence of 
statehood, but should also be cognizant of the twin condition of dismantling occupation so that 
statehood can be viable.  
Without delving into the full political, legal and territorial aspects that statehood and 
ending occupation in line with United Nations resolutions would entail, it is possible to envision 
some of the features of a viable economic policy framework for a peaceful, two-state resolution 
of the conflict. For Palestine to begin elaborating such principles at an early stage would certainly 
enhance its longer-term development prospects, or its national economic security, while also 
acting as an incentive towards peace by demonstrating Palestinian readiness to adopt the 
                                                 
42  Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. PM Netanyahu appoints ministerial committee to improve Palestinian 
   economy and quality of life. 7 May 2009. Available at  
 http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Communiques/2009/PM_Netanyahu_appoints_ministerial_commi
 ttee_improve_Palestinian_economy_7-May-2009.  
43  http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1092810.html. 
44  Federman J. Palestinians give cool reception to Netanyahu’s “economic peace” plan. 7 May 2009. Available 
 at http://www.cnsnews.com/public/Content/Article.aspx?rsrcid=47796.  
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economic policy and related legal and institutional frameworks necessary for the two-state 
solution to succeed.  
What is needed is a shift in the dynamic that determines the Palestinian economic 
framework – away from a nominal bilateralism that actually masks a unilateralism driven by the 
prerequisites of occupation. Instead, a multilateral context is required that offers the Palestinian 
economy the protection of the rule of law and of the rules governing international economic 
relations. This would be in the spirit of the two-state solution and the concept of economic 
viability that is supposed to underpin it. Given that the institutions and much of the economic 
policy framework of the Palestinian Authority–governed economy are primarily defined by the 
PER, as are the economic borders between it and Israel, Jordan and Egypt, the existing legal 
framework remains the departure point for any repositioning of the Palestinian economy such that 
it can be the viable base for an independent State. 
The PER should, therefore, no longer define the parameters or limits of the policy 
framework required for Palestine to be a viable and peaceful State from day one. Rather, a 
different set of principles should be highlighted in trying to carve out the economic policy space 
for a Palestinian State, in particular those which can safeguard its sovereignty in a world of global 
interdependence and market liberalism, such as: 
? Restoring the territorial integrity of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as affirmed in the 
PER and as undeniably necessary for viable statehood; 
? Recognizing the separate status of the Palestinian customs territory, which is implicit 
in the choice made in 1994 by Palestine to opt for a customs union with the separate 
customs territory of Israel, regardless of the form of any permanent status economic 
arrangement between Israel and Palestine; 
? Addressing the special needs of a newly independent, war-torn State as it emerges 
into the community of nations, and equipping it with multilateral means to enhance its 
economic policy space and development prospects; and 
? Beginning today, to form the institutions for a viable State, rather than pursuing the 
incessant reform of institutions of self-government which were designed and still 
function according to a set of promises whose fulfilment remains elusive.  
While both formal and effective sovereignty is a sine qua non for the success of any such 
Palestinian economic peace strategy, what emerges is the essential need to equip Palestinian 
decision-makers with a range of policy instruments premised on sovereignty. Although expanded 
policy space on its own cannot immunize the Palestinian economy from the impact of occupation 
as long as it endures, empowering national institutions (even under occupation) is essential to 
enhancing the private sector’s resilience in the face of crisis. The search for stronger policy-
implementing institutions should consider alternative trade regimes with Israel, Arab countries 
and the rest of the world, and explore how industrial policy can improve trade performance with 
government support measures influencing the environment in which the private sector operates. 
One multilateral forum where Palestine can translate these principles into a case for 
securing the necessary platform for a sovereign national economy in the making is the World 
Trade Organization (WTO). In concrete terms, a new Palestinian economic strategy for peace and 
sovereignty should entail, among other moves, early consideration of acceptance of Palestine, in 
its capacity as representing the separate customs territory administered by the Palestinian 
Authority, as an observer in WTO (pending its eventual accession to the Organization and the 
trade negotiation process that that would entail). Such a move would require the support of all 
members of WTO, especially Palestine’s current and future main trading partners, who would 
eventually shepherd an accession process once it begins.  
VII. Israeli “economic peace” or a Palestinian economic strategy for peace? 
 29
While it would take several years to define the exact shape of the economic policy and 
institutions of the new State, such an initiative would confer immediate economic benefits and a 
measure of economic policy autonomy for Palestine: 
? It would confirm the legal separateness of the Palestinian economy, which is a 
requirement for eventual statehood and for being a viable and reliable partner in 
international economic relations; 
? It would affirm the commitment at an early stage of Palestine, as well as Israel and 
other partners, to resolving trade disputes within the rules-based disciplines and 
system of the multilateral trading system; 
? Indeed, within the context of WTO pluralism, even the PER could remain the basic 
legal reference for Palestinian economic activity for as long as both sides consider it 
desirable, or until the Palestinian State is able to deploy an alternative trade regime 
that satisfies its development imperatives; 
? In the meantime, principles such as free trade, trade facilitation, national treatment 
and special and differential measures for least developed economies that are 
embodied in WTO could serve as guiding principles for the resolution of current 
Israeli–Palestinian trade disputes (including those related to customs operations at 
borders, the trade link between the two parts of the territory etc.) even before 
independence; 
? By re-anchoring the nominal autonomy of the Palestinian economy (even in this pre-
independence stage) within a multilateral recognition framework, rather than in the 
redundant and dysfunctional bilateral framework of the PER, Palestine can define a 
benchmark and a broad reference platform for market liberalism, transparency and 
equity that could infuse economic policymaking in general and send a realistic 
message that Palestine would soon be open for business; 
? In turn, this would help to shape sovereign national economic institutions in the areas 
of trade, public finance, monetary and macroeconomic policy, and intellectual 
property rights – as well as a wide swathe of economic regulation that all members of 
WTO adhere to and attempt to enact in order to level the playing field.  
Such a strategy would reconfirm the Palestinian commitment to peace, but not at the 
expense of viable statehood and effective sovereignty – distinguishing it from the previous 
“accommodating” strategies adopted by the Palestinian Authority. By focusing on the real 
economic needs of statehood, it would also help to economize on the precious time that remains 
before realities on the ground have been transformed too drastically. It is high time to shift the 
paradigm of Israeli–Palestinian economic relations from one of occupation and denial of 
sovereignty to one of parity between partners within a multilateral framework of support and 
peaceful cooperation. Such a reorientation might even improve the chances of what is otherwise 
an unattractive and distant prospect for Palestinians today – namely, an emasculated, provisional, 
non-contiguous and economically dependent “state”, with a small “s” – being transformed into a 
realistic proposition of statehood and independence that would be hard to resist tomorrow.  
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